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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of my thesis paper is to determine which organizations from a wide 
range of NGOs, including their donor relationships, are susceptible to funding manipulation and 
why.  Through review of a focused selection of literature and case studies, I seek to identify a 
pattern of characteristics or variables among the weaker organizations which increases 
vulnerability to such practices. I will review the organizations' size, market competition, funding 
strategies, and supply-led contracts.  I intend to conclude with the various ways in which NGO's 
can protect against funding manipulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the twenty-first century, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are a significant part 
of the international system as the world becomes increasingly globalized and the problems of 
lesser-developed nations become more apparent through the application of foreign policy. By the 
World Bank definition, NGOS are defined as “private organizations that pursue activities to 
relieve the suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic 
social services, or undertake community development.”1 Especially with regards to non-profits, 
the image that is often perceived by the majority of people is that these organizations, because of 
their charitable nature, are autonomous, credible, “do-good” institutions free from politics or 
corruption. Unfortunately, a closer inspection of the finances of these organizations reveals that 
these institutions are more significantly linked to government and private donor agendas than 
their name would inherently lead one to believe.  
The majority of NGO financing can be characterized by two different relationships: one 
between the NGO and the private investor, and the second between the NGO and a government 
(which can be either a host government or a foreign one). NGO and donor relations can further 
be analyzed to include demand-led and supply-led contracts. In a demand-led situation, NGOs 
are in control of the projects and their implementation, while donors have a small voice when 
determining which of the presented options to fund. This scenario is ideal for NGOs, as they 
retain the most in control of their institution and the progress that is made. However, should the 
situation be supply-led, which is the case more often than not, then donors are in charge of 
creating and implementing the programs of the organization. This supply-led scenario is 
                                                 
1
 Carmen Malena, “Working with NGOs : A Practical Guide to Operational Collaboration between the World Bank 
and Nongovernmental Organizations,” The World Bank, March 31, 1995. 
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dangerous for NGOs, because it is when they are most reliant on a single donor’s funds, and 
have little say in the activities of their own organization. By giving donors excessive power, 
NGOs sacrifice autonomy, credibility, and in some cases their core mission and values. The 
resulting situation is one in which donors can easily manipulate the organization to their own 
desires and agendas. These organizations have limited options when it comes to reacting to a 
donors change in objectives, of the three: exit, voice, and adjustment, they more often adjust to 
the donor demands, ultimately resulting in mission creep.  
The second major relationship that increases NGOs’ vulnerability to funding 
manipulation is with the government, either the host or a foreign state. NGOs and governments 
can contradict one another, and an unhealthy relationship of mistrust can result in serious 
obstacles in the organization’s effectiveness and ability to actually assist citizens in its mission. 
The most efficient way for governments to control NGOs is by controlling their funding 
resources. Countries such as Russia and Egypt have implemented laws which restrict NGOs’ 
ability to receive international funding for fear of outside government manipulation and 
infiltration into the host government. At the risk of being charged with treason, most 
organizations in these nations are now unable to deliver services and aid to the beneficiaries of 
their programs and are forced to rely on host government funds to finance operations. Over- 
reliance on government funding is another characteristic which causes NGOs to become more 
vulnerable to manipulation. Organizations which are closely involved with government projects, 
missions, and objectives are more likely to acquiesce to behaviors that would otherwise be 
intolerable. Additionally, the number of advocacy NGOs drops considerably when they are 
dependent on government funding, which affects the overall dynamic of the sector within a 
country. Overall, while government funding is more stable than private donor funds, the conflict 
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of interests as NGOs try to balance the accountability to their investors and their beneficiaries is 
a slippery slope which all too often leads to funds manipulation. 
NGOs have the ability to counteract these hazards to their autonomy and credibility 
through adjustments in three main aspects of their organization: finance, individual, and 
international. Firstly, NGOs can better counteract funding manipulation by diversifying their 
resources. If they can avoid dependence on a single donor or government, then they are more 
likely to have the option to walk away rather than adjust to demands from either entity. This also 
lessens the financial risk and burden as donors are constantly fluctuating their core subject and 
diversification allows an organization to have more fluidity in their sources. NGOs can also take 
individual measures to avoid funding manipulation through creating relationships with donors in 
order to have a space to voice their opinion, being committed to their mission above finances, 
and investing in their own organization. These proactive measures increase the strength and 
commitment of the institution to their original purpose and decrease the chances of goal 
displacement. Finally, on the international level, donors can have more accountability for the 
negative consequences of their conditional lending and fund long term projects that benefit the 
organization and host country as a whole. Donors can increase demand-led scenarios and 
decrease the pressure on NGOs to prioritize them above the beneficiaries. 
This thesis intends to explore which NGOs are more susceptible to funding manipulation 
and whether or not certain characteristics cause them to be so. I hypothesize that smaller to 
medium-size organizations are vulnerable because they have smaller boards and therefore have 
greater disadvantages when it comes to board resources and performance; these disadvantages 
include less access to financial resources which in turn leads to supply-led contracts. Market 
competition is another variable due to its influence on the degree to which an NGO has to 
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outperform other organizations and what funding options are therefore available to the NGO. I 
also hypothesize that high market competition among NGOs combined with low market 
competition among donors creates a toxic combination of supply-led contracts. Additionally, I 
hypothesize that an NGO with targeted funding is weaker because it creates donor dependence 
and limits the NGO’s available reactions to donor demands, which again implies a supply-led 
contract. All three hypotheses have the same result of supply led contracts, and these supply-led 
contracts perpetuate funding manipulation by creating a vulnerability to intuitional isomorphism 
by the donor’s excessive power and control over the organization.
9 
 
ORGANIZATION SIZE 
 Larger non-governmental organizations have distinct advantages over smaller NGOs 
because their size allots them greater resources and positive characteristics that improve their 
performance and strength as a whole. Within the research, it is noticeable that larger NGOs have 
much greater advantages than smaller ones. This can be attributed to the fact that larger 
organizations tend to have larger boards. This importance of boards can be explained by two 
main theories: agency and resource dependency. Additionally, larger boards have frequently 
been shown to have greater performance. Unfortunately, the research and data on organization 
size of non-governmental organizations is rather inconclusive, with the main authors in the field 
often contradicting one another. This stems from a lack of a universal standard when it comes to 
defining what constitutes a “small” NGO. However, enough evidence can be derived to support 
the fact that larger organizations have distinct advantages over smaller ones. Ultimately, the 
research validates that organization size is a strong variable when determining NGO 
performance, as larger organization size was linked to both better performing boards and greater 
financial performance. In other words, larger NGOs are often more financially stable, due to high 
board performance and resources, and therefore are less vulnerable to resource dependence 
which would lead them to be trapped in a supply-led contract. When put in a converse statement, 
smaller NGOs are less financially stable, often due to lower board performance and resources, 
and therefore are more vulnerable to resource dependence which would tend to lead them to be 
trapped in a supply-led contract.  
 The first relationship that needs to be addressed when looking at organization size 
vulnerabilities is the one between an organization’s size and its innovation. Innovation can be 
categorized into two main sections: administrative and technological. “These innovations are 
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believed to be of primary importance for the effectiveness of nonprofit organizations because 
they are related to different systems of organization: the social and the technical.”2 
Administrative innovation can be defined as “changes in organizational administrative processes 
and organizational structure,” such as “communication and exchanges among employees and 
was more directly related to organizational management.”3 This is important to the effectiveness 
and function of an NGO because their administrative innovation is an indicator of how well they 
are able to maintain and adapt organizational management strategies. In order to have a well-
functioning business, management is a crucial aspect as it lays the foundation for the 
dissemination and implementation of information through good communication strategies. 
Technological innovation can be defined as “introducing a change in products or services. It 
occurred as a result of the use of a new tool, technique, or system.”4 This is extremely important, 
especially in the 21
st
 century, because it speaks to the adaptability of a NGO. Conditions, 
materials, policies, and even technology are constantly changing within different regions and 
areas. An innovative non-governmental organization is one that is able to keep up with the 
continuously shifting environment and can manage to continue to thrive. Both administrative and 
technological innovativeness are characteristics that define a superior NGO, therefore it is 
important to recognize the relationship between organization size and innovation. 
 The data that would define the relationship between organization size and innovation is 
actually inconclusive. As previously mentioned, there is not a constant variable or standard by 
which different authors define “size” and therefore there is a wide range of answers as to whether 
organization size actually definitively determines the NGO’s innovation abilities. However, what 
                                                 
2
 Kristina Jaskyte, "Does Size Really Matter? Organizational Size and Innovations in Nonprofit Organizations," 
Nonprofit Management and Leadership 24 (2013): 231. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
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is clear is that larger organizations have a greater advantage over smaller NGOs in terms of the 
benefits they exemplify. A research study was conducted by Jaskyte to provide greater detail on 
the exact variables that link nonprofit size to innovation.  This was done over a three year period 
analyzing 79 organizations from four states in the U.S. (Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, 
and Florida).
5
  The results were then implemented into a complied analysis combining other 
macro studies on innovation and size. One major finding was that “the researchers who proposed 
that size facilitates innovation adoption have noted that large organizations have greater control 
over the environment and provide wider opportunities for employee development, growth, and 
promotion.”6 This is significant because having control over the environment makes an NGO 
less vulnerable to outside variables, such as pressures from donors. 
This is further supported by the second finding that larger organizations have more 
resources, and therefore are able to manage losses due to unsuccessful changes or programs.
7
 
More financial stability means that large organizations have the advantage to be more creative 
NGOs since there is room for a trial and error process. Not only is there a financial advantage for 
these NGOs, but there is also a human capital one. “Large organizations have more diverse staff 
who offer the “know-how” and skills needed for creation and adoption of innovations.”8 The 
brain power and skills which are present in larger organizations further the ability of a larger 
NGOs to outperform the smaller ones, as it implies a superior “think tank” for innovative 
solutions and troubleshooting when things go wrong. These advantages all accumulate to a point 
where “size can facilitate innovation adoption, because those organizations with greater volumes 
                                                 
5
 Jaskyte, “Does Size Really Matter?” 235. 
6
 Jaskyte, “Does Size Really Matter?” 232. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid.  
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of activities are better able to afford innovation.”9 That is not to say that smaller organizations 
lack all innovation, however, the benefits that are listed above are less likely to be present within 
smaller organizations.  
 Actually, in the same research study, the results proposed that smaller organizations can 
also be innovative both administratively and technologically.  First, “small organizations are 
believed to be more innovative because they have more flexibility and ability to change and 
improve and can accept and implement change more easily.”10 Rather than trying to disseminate 
change through a large NGO, which would take much time and effort, it is a rather 
straightforward statement that smaller organizations would be more administratively innovative 
because they have less to change due to their size. Not only are smaller nonprofits shown in the 
research to be successful in administrative innovation, but they are also shown to have great 
potential in technological innovation. “Smaller and less complex organizations have the potential 
to introduce more technological innovations because they are more nimble and because they 
have greater flexibility to respond to changed circumstances.”11 Once again, having a smaller 
size seemingly gives a greater advantage over larger NGOs, as small NGOs are predicted to be 
more adaptable to changes, which is a constant part of the nongovernmental sector in the 21
st
 
century. What is important to note is that the benefits of being a larger nonprofit far outweighed 
the potential for innovation in small ones. Large organizations had control over their 
environment, room for employee growth, more resources and financial flexibility, as well as 
more diverse staff with greater knowledge and skill. Small organizations have the ability to 
“implement change more easily” and be flexible. This leads to the conclusion that what is 
                                                 
9
 Jaskyte, “Does Size Really Matter?” 232.  
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. 
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important is not whether or not organization size has a direct influence on an organization’s 
innovation, but rather that larger organizations have been shown to have greater advantages, 
which lead them to be stronger organizations. Without the protection of these advantages, 
smaller NGOs are more vulnerable to institutional isomorphism. 
 One of the explanations for larger organizations having more access to the benefits listed 
above, lies in one of the founding systematic installations of the nongovernmental sector, the 
board of directors. Nongovernmental board members are crucial links to the organization’s 
performance and innovation, as “in nonprofit organizations the board of directors and the 
executive director form the leadership core and are critical components of governance.”12 
Interestingly, all the benefits of larger organizations and innovation directly parallel the benefits 
of an organization having a large board of directors. While the two cannot be exclusively linked 
together, it is important to note the distinct similarities in the positive effects and access to 
resources. Studies have shown that “the larger organizations tend to have larger boards.”13 
Larger boards can then be linked to being more efficient governing bodies which then leads back 
to innovative organizations. Reflecting back on the Jaskyte study, a larger board size was a 
“predictor of technological innovations and total number of innovations.14 One of the reasons 
this is true is because “organizations with larger boards tended to introduce more new services 
and programs, produce more new products, introduce more new activities and events for clients, 
employees, and volunteers, and change significantly existing services and programs.”15 
Secondly, a larger board means that there are more board members, which implies “richer human 
capital, broader networks, more diverse know-how and skill bases, and stronger community 
                                                 
12
 Jaskyte, “Does Size Really Matter?” 242. 
13
 Chris Cornforth and Claire Simpson, "Change and Continuity in the Governance of Nonprofit Organizations in the 
United Kingdom: The Impact of Organizational Size," Nonprofit Management & Leadership 12 (2002): 465. 
14
 Jaskyte, “Does Size Really Matter?” 242. 
15
 Ibid. 
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connections.”16 Facilitating community connections is by far one of the most important roles that 
board members can play because it allows for greater representation within the community and 
can bring more financial resources and opportunities to the organization.
17
 Finally, these benefits 
which come with having a large board of directors can be accomplished with proper institutional 
support for the board that would allow it to perform well. Unfortunately, this critical support is 
seen more often in larger nonprofits, rather than smaller ones. 
A study conducted by Cornforth and Simpson randomly selected 500 charities from 
England and Wales, ranging in annual incomes of £0-10 million in 1998.
18
 They were 
researching the relationship between organization size and different board characteristics, and 
found that the “area where significant differences between charities of different sizes concerned 
the structure of boards.” This is critical to understanding a nonprofit organization because the 
strength and efficiency of the organization lies with the capabilities of a board. Larger nonprofits 
have some advantages with their board structure because those characteristics are correlated with 
efficient boards. For example, “the likelihood of boards having subcommittees increased with the 
size of organization”19 This can be significant because it implies that their board managed to 
compartmentalize and assign special tasks into focused groups, which is a sign of effective 
management. “Also, the support available to board members in terms of written job descriptions 
and induction and training increases with the size of the organization…”20 This is crucial to a 
board running effectively because the members understand their roles and expectations before 
walking into the job. Greater organization and easier transitions are just two of the many benefits 
when it comes to having the proper support for a board. If there is a clear set of standards and 
                                                 
16
 Jaskyte, “Does Size Really Matter?” 242. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Cornforth and Simpson, “Change and Continuity in the Governance,” 454. 
19
 Cornforth and Simpson, “Change and Continuity in the Governance,” 465. 
20
 Ibid. 
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expectations for board members, then they can create the baseline of performance that would 
encompass “innovative thinking” and “creative approaches”.21 In general, the efficiency of the 
board of directors has a fundamental role to play in non-governmental organizations which can 
be explored through two major theories: agency and resource dependency. 
One of the most dominant theories regarding the role of the board of directors and their 
function within an organization is “monitoring management on behalf of shareholders and that 
effective monitoring can improve firm performance by reducing agency costs.”22 This theory 
explains how board members can protect the organization against managers who would put their 
self-interested goals above that of profit maximization.
23
 However, in relation to nonprofit or 
larger scale non-governmental organizations, the agency theory could explain how boards offer 
protection against one of the most common consequences of vulnerabilities: mission creep. 
Mission creep can be defined as a nonprofit slowly shifting its original founding purpose and 
mission for other objectives outside of its specialty in order to accommodate external pressures. 
This agency theory exemplifies the importance of the board of directors to NGOs because 
“legally, nonprofit boards are responsible to fulfill a duty of obedience, which essentially means 
that the directors are responsible to ensure that the organization fulfils its public responsibility as 
reflected in its organizational mission.”24 This includes monitoring activities to stay within the 
bylaws and acknowledging the “historical precedence” of an institution in its current actions, 
thereby making the “boards serve a monitoring and accountability function by actively linking 
                                                 
21
 Jaskyte, “Does Size Really Matter?” 242. 
22
 Amy J. Hillman and Thomas Dalziel, "Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and 
Resource Dependence Perspectives," The Academy of Management Review 28 (2003): 383. 
23
 Hillman and Dalziel, “Boards of Directors,” 384. 
24
 William A. Brown, "Exploring the Association between Board and Organizational Performance in Nonprofit 
Organizations," Nonprofit Management and Leadership 15 (2005): 322. 
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decision making to organizational mission.”25 This is a fundamentally crucial check to place on 
an NGO and the importance of an effective board is emphasized.  
 Another theory as to why boards are especially important to non-governmental 
organizations is the resource dependency theory. This “function refers directly to the ability of 
the board to bring resources to the firm, resources being “anything that could be thought of as a 
strength or weakness of a given firm.”26  Four benefits or resources that a board can bring to an 
organization can be categorized as legitimacy, advice and counsel, communication networks, and 
privileged access to outside groups.
27
  A board can provide legitimacy through its prestigious 
members, who bring more credibility to the organization. Basically, “prestigious or legitimate 
persons or organizations represented on the focal organization’s board provide confirmation to 
the rest of the world of the value and worth of the organization.”28 This is significant, especially 
for a startup NGO, because reputation is what can drive popularity, better access to larger 
networks, and credibility within the public, which is where the organization is hoping to derive 
much of its support from.  Secondly, boards can also provide advice and council through their 
members’ direct background experiences. This is because “boards are often composed of 
lawyers, financial representatives, top management of other firms, public affairs or marketing 
specialists, former government officials and community leaders, and other directors who bring 
with them important expertise, experience, and skills to facilitate advice and counsel.”29  In other 
words, choosing the right board members can provide great human capital to the organization in 
regards to the members’ experiences outside that of the NGO.  
                                                 
25
 Brown, “Exploring the Association,” 322. 
26
 Hillman and Dalziel, “Boards of Directors,” 385. 
27
 Hillman and Dalziel, “Boards of Directors,” 386. 
28
 Hillman and Dalziel, “Boards of Directors,” 387. 
29
 Ibid. 
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The third and fourth benefits of communication networks and privileged access work 
strongly in the favor of NGOs. The board of directors has a “political dimension” as they 
represent a connection to the community, in that they are able to establish relationships with key 
figures and advocates for the NGO. For example, “when directors established connections to the 
U.S. government…such connections held the promise for information flow, more open 
communication, and/or potential influence with the government.”30  This can even expand into 
the non-governmental organization’s ability to find donors, as the connections that board 
members have can translate into future donors as “board capital can be helpful in acquiring 
resources from important elements outside the firm, such as financial capital influence and 
influence with political bodies or other important stakeholder groups (such as customers, 
suppliers, and communities.)”31 Once again, this emphasizes the relevance and significance of an 
individual’s network capabilities within the realm of a larger non-governmental organization’s 
firm. “Empirical evidence has shown that executives’ external ties play a critical role in future 
strategy formulation and subsequent firm performance.”32 The better a board is able to provide 
the resources, the better the NGO is able to perform. This is because when the resources come 
from inside the organization, they are less dependent on outside sources, and this would 
“diminish uncertainty for the firm, [create] lower transaction costs, and ultimately aid in the 
survival of the firm.”33 This also addresses the idea of having greater human capital in a board 
that would provide access to resources and innovation. As evidenced above, a board of directors 
is a critical aspect to a non-governmental organization through all the positive benefits they can 
bring to strengthen the institution.  
                                                 
30
 Hillman and Dalziel, “Boards of Directors,” 387. 
31
 Hillman and Dalziel, “Boards of Directors,” 388. 
32
 Hillman and Dalziel, “Boards of Directors,” 387. 
33
 Hillman and Dalziel, “Boards of Directors,” 386. 
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   Outstanding board performance is linked to both the agency theory and the resource 
dependency theory because the benefits listed would only be possible if the board was running 
efficiently and effectively. A research study conducted by Brown collected data from 304 
nonprofit organizations in the greater Los Angeles and the Phoenix metropolitan areas.
34
 The 
study utilized the research data to investigate six different aspects of board performance within 
the context of theories explained above. In other words, an “analysis was conducted to determine 
the extent to which organizational and board characteristics accounted for performance.”35 There 
were data to support that both the agency theory and resource dependency theory were correct. 
Additionally, they found that the most important factor in experiencing good performance was 
the organization’s size. “Larger organizations tended to report better-performing boards and were 
more likely to exhibit better financial performance.” 36 While the data did not conclusively state 
that this was exclusively due to the board of directors, or perhaps the larger budget by virtue of a 
larger organization, the ultimate significant factor is that larger organizations had better-
performing boards. Better performing boards would then exemplify the benefits of both the 
agency theory and the resource dependency theory which have already been assessed as critical 
characteristics to maintaining a non-governmental organization’s strength and stability.  
 Research does not explicitly state that smaller NGOs are worse than large NGOs, but 
rather statements are made, such as, “organizational size is typically associated with the level of 
success that organizations exhibit in responding to external challenges” and “organizations that 
are large have more power and leverage over their environments,” which clarify the advantages 
                                                 
34
 Brown, “Exploring the Association,” 326. 
35
 Brown, “Exploring the Association,” 333. 
36
 Ibid. 
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that larger organizations have over smaller ones.
37
 These advantages make the smaller non-
governmental organizations weaker and more vulnerable in comparison because they are benefits 
that protect larger organizations from the frequent external pressures that NGOs often succumb 
to due to external factors like resource dependence, which leads to huge donor leverage during 
negotiations. Larger organizations are not necessarily more innovative than smaller 
organizations, however, studies have shown that the characteristics of a large organization’s 
innovation far surpasses those of smaller ones. These characteristics almost identically parallel 
the ones listed for organizations with a large board of directors. Large organizations have been 
proven to often have a large and highly effective board of directors.  A high-performing board of 
directors brings many benefits to an organization, and this level of performance has also been 
linked to being typical of larger organizations. Smaller NGOs still have the capability of having 
an effective board, however, studies show that most of the organizational attributes which create 
a resilient institution are privileges enjoyed by larger organizations largely by virtue of the 
resources and network access granted by their size. Ultimately, smaller non-governmental 
organizations are put at a distinct disadvantage within the NGO sector at large because they tend 
to have smaller boards, which often are characterized by less resources and lower performance.  
This works to create a distinct vulnerability in these smaller organizations as they have fewer 
options with negotiations, and this lack of options often leads to entering a toxic supply-led 
contract.  
  
                                                 
37
 Rosa Sanchez Salgado, “NGO Structural Adaptation to Funding Requirements and Prospects for Democracy: The 
Case of the European Union,” Global Society 24 (2010): 46. 
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MARKET COMPETITION 
 For most non-governmental organizations there is a sense that “charity” is mutually 
exclusive with “politics.” This false assumption is founded by “the optimism of the proponents 
of NGOs [which] derives from a general sense of NGOs as doing good, unencumbered and 
untainted by the politics of government or the greed of the market.”1 Unfortunately, the market 
has a huge influence over non-governmental organizations as it presents one of their key 
vulnerabilities. This market competition is two-fold, both among NGOs and among donors. High 
market competition between NGOs implies that there are many NGOs in the same location, 
competing for the same resources, and often fulfilling similar social services. Low market 
competition between donors allows for the donors to be in greater control of the contracting 
situation and only increases the already high market competition between NGOs as they fight for 
a select group of donor funds. The high market competition among NGOs and the low market 
competition among donors works against most non-governmental organizations as they are often 
left with little choice but to enter into toxic supply-led contracts.  
 In the 1990s, there were multiple global emergencies, such as the Rwanda and Bosnia 
genocides, which really pushed NGOs to their limits in regards to their private donor capacities.
2
 
Rather than governments stepping in to assist NGOs, there was a shift in mentality in which 
there was a “governmental retreat from domestic social sectors” and this resulted in an increased 
pressure on local charities.
3
 It is significant to recognize that non-governmental organizations are 
now often expected to perform social services that would normally be within the realm of local 
                                                 
1
  William Fisher, “DOING GOOD? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices,” Annual Review Anthropology,  
26 (1997): 442.  
2
 Ian Smillie, “NGOs and development assistance: a change in mind-set?” Third World Quarterly, 18 (1997): 565. 
3
 Ibid. 
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governance, rather than working in tandem to fill in the cracks for which the government fails to 
provide. Non-governmental organizations are supposedly not to be closely linked with either 
international or host governments. However, data displayed later will show that the two are more 
closely allied through funding than a basic surface perception would lead one to believe. 
Therefore, the most successful NGOs are the ones that are able to maintain their autonomy while 
still working with the government on projects that help their beneficiaries in a wide range of 
sectors. NGOs are not meant to act in lieu of the government but rather to work in concert with 
them, when possible, to ensure that their beneficiaries’ rights, when applicable, and needs are 
being met. However, with the governments slowly pulling back funds under the assumption that 
the NGOs will fulfill those roles, the “expectations that international development NGOs can 
significantly enlarge current levels of financial burden-sharing are probably, therefore, 
unrealistic.”4 This mentality then becomes detrimental to NGOs because it decreases the 
competition among donor funding options and increases the demand for finding donors, a 
situation that works against the NGO sector as a whole. This shift in mentality proved to be 
unfortunate as the combination of both factors resulted in a greater competition in fundraising for 
NGOs that were already maxed out on their service capabilities. When there is an increased 
competition for the monetary resources available to NGOs, the demand for funding becomes 
greater than the supply, thus the organizations themselves become vulnerable to their donors.  
 Market competition is rather controversial within the realm of NGO discussions because 
there is conflicting research and data as to whether or not high market competition between 
NGOs increases or decreases their efficiency.  Some researchers will argue that increased 
competition would actually benefit the NGO sector’s accountability and performance. The 
                                                 
4
 Smillie, “NGOs and development assistance” 565. 
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justification is that “NGOs have often been criticized for their lack of accountability and limited 
impact. Competition for donor funding creates incentives for NGOs to work harder, cut 
unnecessary costs, and resist temptations to misappropriate funds.”5 In theory this would work, 
as “a highly competitive NGO sector would improve the overall influence and effectiveness of 
civil society within the domestic political environment. The high-performing NGOs will thrive, 
while the ineffectual organizations fade away.”6  However, it is important to note that this 
argument in favor of market competition benefiting NGOs is invalid because the benefit of 
greater financial efficiency resulting from increased market competition only applies to a small 
number of organizations. Financial efficiency for NGO’s is measured by the extent to which the 
daily finances are operated in such a way that the least amount of funds are spent raising more 
funds, administrative costs are well managed, and the majority of expenditures are made in 
providing the programs and services aligned with the mission of the NGO.
7
 However the reality 
is that "Most global NGOs today struggle to master the complexities of managing efficient, 
integrated operations in large part due to restrictions placed on them by funders."
8
 Additionally, 
one of the greatest flaws with this argument overall is that non-governmental organization 
efficiency looks at the budget and numbers rather than larger consequences beyond spreadsheets. 
A well run organization is more than what market pressures would classify as “a highly 
competitive” NGO, as characteristics like reputation and strength of on the ground relationships 
cannot be measured by data spreadsheets. Therefore, when looking at data summaries and 
analysis of the benefits of market competition, the research does not successfully incorporate a 
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holistic view of an effective organization, invalidating their overall defense that high market 
competition is ultimately beneficial for non-governmental organizations.  
NGO market efficiency is often measured by the overall budget amount that consists of 
administrative costs and fundraising expenses, which in other words is called the “efficiency 
price of NGO aid” measured by Ribar and Wilhelm.9 Research was conducted in 2007 using 559 
US-based non-governmental organizations registered with USAID in the international 
development sector. Examining the data revealed that for organizations with already existing 
“particularly high administrative costs”, fierce competition tends to curb these expenses.10 It is 
significant that increased competition does not seem to make the entire market more efficient, 
but rather a small specific group of NGOs are bettered. Interestingly, the data also pointed out 
that “fiercer competition does not affect the expenses for fundraising across our sample of US 
NGOs.”11 While this may be true for this specific case, by no means is it justifiable to say that 
this theory can apply on a large, international scale. Also, these US NGOs have the distinct 
advantage of being based in the United States, with the luxury of an already solid donor base and 
grant options that developing countries simply cannot access. In a perfect world, market 
competition would bring more positive change to the NGO sector by increasing their market 
efficiency and the Darwinism of businesses would ensure that only the best organizations remain 
standing.  However, the cutthroat funding competition that exists in the global NGO world today 
has consequences for both the individual organization and the entire sector itself which would 
outweigh any marginal benefits that increased competition would bring.   
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The negative effect of competition on NGOs is that the organizations withdraw time and 
energy from their services and programs in order to secure funding. This is brought about by two 
main market pressures: that of the limited supply of donor funding availabilities and that of the 
high number of NGOs existing within the same sector. An example of these effects is “NGOs 
under fierce pressure to attract donations may engage in “excessive” fundraising and shift an 
increasing amount of time and effort ‘from finding solutions and helping needy recipients to 
pleasing their donors and winning television coverage.”12  This is a serious issue, as the 
beneficiaries for whom the NGO is held accountable are often at the core of their mission 
statements, but in order to stay in the market the NGO must spend its time and energies to secure 
the needed funding. The organization is put in an awkward situation of difficult decisions 
regarding prioritization, and more often than not, securing finances ranks higher than the needs 
of those who benefit from the program.  This is not the worst of the consequences, as “in certain 
contracting situations, research has suggested that competition for scarce resources can cause 
NGOs to align their missions with donor preferences, emulate for-profit contractors, and 
ultimately abandon their missions in pursuit of financial security.”13 Co-optation of NGOs and 
mission creep are two major effects of high market competition vulnerabilities within non-
governmental organizations.  
NGOs which are in fierce competitive environments often find themselves working 
against large negative feedback loops that push them further into difficulties. For example, 
“external control of NGOs through the marketization of the external environment and the use of 
short-term contracts may cause NGOs to adopt business orientations to compete more effectively 
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against for-profit contractors, transforming NGOs into de facto businesses driven by excessive 
competition to neglect their missions in the pursuit of financial security.”14 In other words, non-
governmental organizations are driven to use methods and mechanisms they would have 
otherwise deterred themselves from implementing in order to compete in the market. These 
“business orientations” are more closely aligned with the for-profit sector, and their usage is so 
often considered outside of the non-governmental organization’s charitable nature. “Cooley and 
Ron (2002) argue that in particular the “marketization” of official NGO funding tends to work 
against NGO efficiency, in contrast to the efficiency enhancing effects expected by the 
proponents of marketization.”15 These organizations learn to specialize in fundraising and 
marketing, which then leads to overall inefficiency as “the increasing use of competitive tenders 
and renewable contracts by official financiers discourages cost-saving cooperation among NGOs 
and leads to waste and duplication as NGOs ‘may seek to undermine competitors, conceal 
information, and act unilaterally.’”16 This trend is also paralleled on a larger international scale 
as “competition between international NGOs has also increased, weakening the potential for 
better coordination.” 17  There is a duality of competition in this instance which negates any 
benefits resulting from more administrative effectiveness due to the loss of cooperation among 
NGOs. Also, the duplication of NGOs is already an existing problem within the sector as too 
many of them exist to provide the same services. By discouraging positive cooperative behaviors 
among NGOs as a consequence of the increased competition among them, there are greater 
market inefficiencies than that of high administrative costs. It is shown that when it comes to 
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market pressures and choosing between staying true to their mission and financial stability, 
financial security will be prioritized.  
This negative feedback loop is continued as “external control may reduce an NGO’s 
ability to author innovative programming resulting in goal displacement. Compelled by the 
external environment, NGOs are incentivized to manipulate their programs to match donor 
preferences regardless of mission identity or beneficiary need.”18  This donor funding 
manipulation will be explained in greater detail in the following chapter regarding NGOs and 
targeting funding. However, the seriousness of “goal displacement” is one that should be 
addressed when looking at the consequences of toxic market competition. Non-governmental 
organizations function well as an intermediary between host governments and local citizens 
because they can provide platforms and solutions outside the typical ones allotted by the 
government, whether they be for public advocacy or for social services. Also, nonprofits working 
on the ground are often the closest way for international donors to be connected to the problems 
at hand and understand the nuances of a dilemma, as they are closely tied to the specificities and 
local characteristics of the region.  Manipulating programs to match donor preferences no longer 
caters to those whom the non-governmental organization serves. This is a loss to both 
beneficiaries, as they are directly affected by the change in focus and services of the 
organization, and to international donors, as they can change the aspects of an organization that 
made them an ideal intermediary between themselves and the host government in the first place.  
This can most clearly be seen in the case of the European Union. Since their coalition formed, 
NGOs can now pool their funds from a larger, shared source. This is favorable because it 
“foster[s] the growth of NGOs,” however, it also “promote[s] the creation of new actors and 
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what is referred to as goal succession.”19  Goal succession is basically another form of goal 
displacement, which is acknowledged as a coping mechanism for NGOs when they shift towards 
alliance with their donors’ priorities in order to increase resources available to them. 20 While 
these European NGOs now had access to grant funding from the European Union, there was the 
larger consequence of them being compelled to adapt to what the EU wanted in return for access 
to these funds. The uniqueness and innovation of non-governmental organizations is sacrificed 
when they cater to market pressure and donor demands, furthering distancing themselves from 
their mission statements.   
This negative feedback loop is then continued on a larger global scale of Northern versus 
Southern NGOs. As defined by Hudock, Southern NGOs are “passive recipients, conduits, or 
subcontractors that provide indigenous knowledge” and Northern NGOs which basically supply 
the funding.
21
 For example, in their civil society partnerships program, UNICEF funded and 
assisted local Pakistani NGOs to create safe spaces for women and children after severe flooding 
in 2010.
22
 In this case, UNICEF would be a “Northern NGO” and the local Pakistani 
organizations could be considered the “Southern NGOs.”  “As the international aid architecture 
is generally characterized by flows of resources from the global North to the global South, 
resource dependence risks subjugating Southern NGOs to Northern control. In addition to 
potentially stifling NGO independence, authenticity, and innovation, resource dependence may 
reinforce global inequalities by co-opting transformative Southern NGOs into the Northern 
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sphere of influence.”23  This perhaps is the most important factor as it reflects how the market 
pressures can be viewed from beyond the micro scale within a specific NGO sector or 
geographic location towards a larger macro international one. This quotation addresses a larger 
issue of Eastern versus Western notions of power and what the “right” answers are towards 
developmental problems. Rather than ground-up grass roots solutions, market competition causes 
resource dependence which promotes top-down action. As mentioned above, this action can be 
“stifling” for NGOs, but more importantly, it can leave them without tailored solutions to the 
specific region. These nuances are what make nonprofits and NGOs grounded and allows them 
to serve as experts in deriving solutions to the particular problem. More importantly, Northern 
spheres of influence could actually trap developing countries in their positions rather than help 
them innovate their way up the global ladder, which is inherently contradictory to the original 
purpose of these non-governmental organizations in the first place. 
 For example, this can be seen on a smaller scale with an analysis of the effect of the 
European Union on NGOs. One of the more prominent points that they advocated for was the 
adoptions of “New Public Management Techniques” (NPM), which consisted of guidelines for 
better strategic and project management within an organization.
24
 This NPM became widely 
adopted by large organizations such as Care UK and Amnesty International, not just because of 
EU encouragement but also because “they were in contact with other donors promoting the same 
criteria, such as USAID, DFID or the World Bank or they were influenced by the evolution of 
public marketing techniques.”25 This example is crucial in showing how large NGOs can shift to 
become more homogenous because of public marketing and market trends. This can then spread 
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to smaller local non-governmental organizations if the standards applied to large ones are 
expected of them as well. “Convergence within the humanitarian sector in Europe is, then, also 
guaranteed by the existing consensus among international donors about sound financial 
management and NPM techniques and by the strong links among humanitarian NGOs based in 
different countries.
26
 In this instance, better project management and financial efficiency are not 
necessarily bad traits to expect in an organization. However, it is important to recognize that a 
less financially efficient NGO could get overlooked by donors, even if they had a better solution 
or were more connected to on the ground efforts because they did not fit into market standards.   
As evidenced above, market competition can create vicious feedback loops for NGOs 
with more unintended consequences beyond that of a more efficient budget. Interagency 
cooperation is lost and the organizations become more vulnerable to donor demands with 
increased pressure for resources. Non-governmental organizations become more competitive 
amongst themselves and are less willing to collaborate with one another. Donors maintain 
leverage within negotiations and demands because there is low competition amongst the donors 
themselves.  With greater donor power, NGOs increase the likelihood in which they will be 
subject to supply led contracts.  
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TARGETED FINANCES 
One of the largest vulnerabilities for a non-governmental organization, especially in the 
non-profit world, is its financial fragility. Organizations that are finically dependent on few 
sources are more vulnerable to manipulation by both host and international governments. By 
controlling the finances, these entities have greater control of the organization which often leads 
to political manipulation, Due to a lack of internal assessment protocols and the deliberate 
prioritization of financial stability within the standard non-governmental organization; these 
NGOs continue to maintain these weaknesses detrimental to their institutions. Funding 
dependency can be categorized by donor options, both governmental and international, and while 
their initial motivations for usurpation of organizational governance may be similar, the 
consequential effects on NGOs are dramatically different.  
An NGO often turns to international donors because of the lack of resources available in 
its own region. This is especially true for developing countries, which have an abundant 
concentration of non-profits and international organizations working for them.
1
 The scarcity of 
funds available in the host government leads to a redirection of fund seekers to international 
agencies. However this is at the expense of their autonomy and effectiveness as “this often 
requires clustering their activities in sectors decided by foreign donor agencies, as well as 
submitting to [sic] their philosophical and operational plans to scrutiny. In addition, most donor 
agencies tend to allocate resources for immediate events or tasks, thereby giving little attention 
to long-term activities of NGOs.”2 This is significant because more often than not a foreign 
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donor’s priorities do not fully incorporate the knowledge and cultural understanding that an on-
the-ground NGO would have. Not only is there a cultural clash if there is a lack of 
understanding, but also long term versus short term priority is key to determining whether or not 
an institution is ultimately effective. The pressure placed on NGOs by donors to increase results 
for better looking numbers results in a serious lack of advancement towards implementation of 
the larger, and often the most important dream plan. One of the worst effects is mission creep, 
which often happens with smaller, local NGOs in a developing or crisis region. For example, 
Palestinian NGOs transformed from social service providers to political advocates when donors 
began to emphasize democracy and civil participation around the 2006 elections.
3
 This shift can 
also be reversed, such as in the case of Bangladesh, when the NGO sector reoriented itself away 
from political mobilization towards social service provisions when donors decided that the latter 
category was the latest trendy investment. 
4
 The lack of availability of unrestricted resources 
forces NGOs to transform their mission statements in an effort to survive and to finance their 
organizations, even at the expense of their autonomy. Ultimately the NGO suffers the most from 
this practice in terms of power and credibility, as international donor agencies benefit from the 
successful implementation of their own agendas via funding these organizations with both 
“financial supremacy and an indefinite patronage.”5 
The effectiveness of an organization is also severely compromised when it is significantly 
dependent on an international donor. International donors dominate the events, activities, and 
calendars of the organization and even restrict funding to certain occasions or programs.
6
 In 
doing so, the NGO is limited to immediate band-aid type solutions for underlying problems 
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which would more strategically require slow and long-term responses to efficiently address the 
root of their problems. One of the best examples of NGO work implemented as band-aid 
solutions can be seen through the distribution of foreign aid. For example, organizations such as 
Save the Children and Oxfam have been called into question as they “are governed from a single 
country in Europe or North America; they talk constantly about partnership, but rarely practice it 
in their relationships with NGOs in other parts of the world; and their nongovernmental status 
sits uneasily with the large grants most of them receive from official aid agencies and their 
unwillingness to confront deep-rooted questions of politics and power.”7 These contracts with 
official aid agencies make the NGOs themselves agents for distributing foreign aid, mostly in 
lieu of creating on the ground relations to help implement permanent change.   
The two most prominent scholars in this discussion are Jeffery Sachs, who advocates in 
favor of the foreign aid as it is, and William Easterly, who argues against the current 
implementation of aid. Sachs grounds his argument in the fact that developing countries are 
largely in their current predicaments because of multiple factors out of their control that work 
against them, such as climate, physical isolation, and disease, rather than from a shift in priorities 
from donor agencies.
8
 Therefore it is a developed country’s responsibility to help these lesser 
developed countries jumpstart their path to development. He then declares that by providing 
goods and services for free, donors would be investing in areas such as health and education, and 
then hypothetically the government would slowly begin to take over these roles. This aid is also 
in the self-interest of larger nations because it simultaneously combats global terrorism and 
corruption by eliminating the state of restlessness that is often the root cause of these vices. 
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Sachs then supports this argument with the example of the eradication of both polio and African 
River Blindness, courtesy of foreign aid.
9
 In both of these cases the direct investment of free 
goods, such as vaccinations, had a high return on the overall improvement in global health, and 
this can also be paralleled for most international emergency aid examples. However, when it 
comes to actual long term development goals, foreign aid creates more harm than it does good.  
Easterly’s main argument is that current foreign aid practices do not reform weak 
institutions or ban policy making, thus putting the developing country at a distinct disadvantage. 
Without this needed social progression, aid actually weakens a government by damaging its 
legitimacy and removing the accountability the government has to provide for its citizens. 
Ironically, it is also the access to the international funds that limits NGOs from being more 
effective and autonomous: “the fact that NGOs are able to access certain sums of money from 
outside sources, at times under easy terms, prevents them from taking major initiatives in order 
to improve their financial standing.”10 These handouts are less effective as they come with 
already predisposed Western ideas of what is the “best” way to solve a problem which may not 
be applicable or tailored enough to the region itself. Simultaneously, there is no demand for 
innovative thinking when the conditional solutions are handed to beneficiaries.  Easterly argues 
for an alternative approach to foreign aid that he claims will benefit the struggling nation. This 
methodology is otherwise known as the “searcher” approach, where the foreign investor provides 
alternative approaches, involves locals, and listens closely to what is actually needed rather than 
dictating what should be done.
11
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One of the biggest examples Easterly provides to justify his argument is the case of bed 
nets in Malawi and Zambia. Bed nets are critical when trying to combat mosquito-borne diseases 
such as malaria, and are an effective way a small change can positively affect the health of an 
entire nation. In Zambia 70% of people given bed nets for free did not use them. However with 
Malawi, the bed nets are sold to antenatal clinics, and an incentive program was created by 
nurses who get income by selling them to mothers, who then protect both themselves and the 
incoming generation from such diseases. The program also sells the nets to rich Malawians and 
the profits from these sales are then used to subsidize the nets sold in clinics.
12
 This example of 
bed nets in Malawi demonstrates how a ground-up solution can be sustainable and have profound 
effects on the community through a reward system program that addressed the climate and 
culture of the region. Understanding that most foreign donors do not opt into this mode of 
thinking, and rather adopt a “white man’s burden” mentality is crucial when analyzing the 
dangers of foreign investors. Fix-it and band-aid solutions are only effective when the donors 
listen to the beneficiaries on the ground and think in longer term time frames for success. 
Unfortunately, this is less numerically pleasing to investors who want quick projects with high 
results, and so the non-governmental field is filled with Easterly’s definition of “planners” rather 
than “searchers”. While this seems to be a problem regarding foreign donors, it affects the NGO 
world dramatically when organizations are reliant on a few sources for funding, which ultimately 
become toxic relationships for the organizations.  
Increasing dependence on foreign funds calls to question the NGO’s autonomy and 
credibility. This is especially true for politically oriented organizations and calling into question 
their prioritization of donor interests above those of the nation is an easy way to devalue their 
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efforts and potentially threaten their sustainability.
13
 The situation is rather a negative feedback 
loop of destruction, especially for nonprofits in developing nations. The developing country does 
not have the resources to fund the NGO, so the organization relies on international donors. 
However, if they do not diversify the types of donors, such as donations from the general public 
and foundation grants, then they become dependent on a few international resources, and 
vulnerable in their loss of autonomy. If they decide to continue with the international donor, 
despite their wavering priorities and control, their credibility is called to question. However 
rejection of the international donor is not an option because the NGOs do not have alternative 
resources for two reasons: their governments lack the funds, and the constant availability of 
international resources does not force the NGO to become financially autonomous.
14
  
Although NGOs are often trapped in these vicious cycles, it is also true that international 
donors are not always completely benevolent and the public should have the ability to question 
their ultimate motivations. International funds can come with conditions and ulterior motives in 
targeted countries by which they seek to make political changes through indirect means. This can 
be seen in the case of Lebanon where bilateral donors “have their own interests and agenda to 
influence the public policy in Lebanon and encourage the government to make changes. Instead 
of doing it directly, by funding governmental projects or pressuring the government, donors go 
the indirect way and work with and through NGOs.’’15 Unfortunately cases such as these are not 
isolated to Lebanon, which causes beneficiaries to be skeptical and for governments to take 
extreme action in effort to combat this international donor manipulation. 
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The concerns over the motivations and the control over NGOs for political means 
through international donations  is evidenced by the large number of countries, such as Mexico, 
Venezuela, Azerbaijan, etc., which have adopted laws that directly restrict or monitor foreign 
funding of NGOs.
16
 The fear of having outside nations interfering with national affairs creates 
restrictions and further obstacles for NGOs to overcome regarding international donors. One of 
the main forms of power that is often utilized with host governments in order to assert their 
control over NGOs is by forcing them to be financially reliant on their government by restricting 
foreign donors. This is often seen in autocratic nations such as Egypt, Russia, Sudan, Pakistan, 
etc., which all have law that affects international funding and some of the countries even require 
non-governmental organizations to obtain approval before accepting foreign funds.
17
  Russia 
recently declared that any public organization could not obtain foreign assistance, and if they did 
so and continued to participate in political activities, they had to be registered as “foreign 
agents.”18 Unfortunately, these actions are not confined to overly private nations, such as Russia, 
because other countries, like Nigeria, Malaysia, and Bangladesh are beginning to make plans for 
adopting this restrictive model as well.
19
 The non-profit sectors that are the most critical in these 
regions are also the most affected by these public policy changes as both human rights as well as 
democracy and advocacy focused NGOs bear the majority of the sector’s setbacks. 
 When an organization is dependent on a government for funding, they become vulnerable 
by being too closely tied to a government in fear of totally securing the financial resource. The 
NGO’s whole purpose is then called into question, as something classified as “non-
governmental” quickly becomes defined by the governments’ actions and desires. “The 
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increasing funding of NGOs by official donor agencies thrusts the question of legitimacy into 
center stage, for if NGOs are becoming more responsive to external concerns, are substituting for 
government and are growing larger on the basis of foreign funding, what is happening to the 
links - to their values and mission, and to their relationships with “the poor,” supporters and 
others - through which they derive their right to intervene in development?”20 This quote 
demonstrates the importance of having a sector that is not closely affiliated to the government 
but rather in line with its people. A non-governmental organization’s job is not to replace the 
government, but rather to complement the government by filling gaps in both society and 
development which it has failed to provide. NGOs work in the mentality that one day these 
problems will be eliminated by effective governance.  Additionally the power of an NGO lies in 
the fact that it is inherently “non-governmental.” So when this foundation is lost, the 
consequences of such actions are significant. 
In such situations, specifically, organizations begin to transition from advocacy towards a 
more politically-friendly provision of social services, in other words “the degree of cooptation of 
NGOs by development agencies through funding and joint initiatives is so advanced that NGOs 
are destined to become the organizational mechanism for an international welfare system, 
doomed to be little more than the front men for the lords of poverty.”21  These organizations are 
already struggling to finance their operations, therefore, limitations such as a simple removal of 
international donors can be detrimental to whole sectors of non-governmental organizations. By 
relying on government funding, these organizations become inherently vulnerable and weaker, 
because of their lack of power in confronting officials. The conflict of interest, especially if the 
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government is one of the few funding providers, is overwhelming to the institution’s internal 
system of governance. Ironically, when working on the board of an NGO, one must list any and 
all conflicts of interests. On a standard level, cautious procedures are taken to ensure that any 
member does not have significant power over situations should they have self-interest in the 
matter. Yet, this precaution is not as obviously visible when examining international 
organizations which foster global social change and donate to NGOs.  
 More importantly, the NGO sector, whether in the United States or in the larger 
international community, is much more closely associated with national governments that the 
general population is led to believe. One of the largest contributors to IOs or nonprofits will 
often be a national government, for example, “In 2004, official aid from governments totaled 
$87.7 billion worldwide (World Bank, 2006), with $19.7 billion from the United States (OECD, 
2006). A substantial portion of the US government foreign aid was provided by means of NGOs 
in the United States, for example, nearly 15 percent of official economic aid was channeled 
through NGOs (USAID, 2006). Another 18 percent of U.S. official aid flowed through 
intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations (OECD, 2006); 
these, in turn, routed yet more through NGOs. This governmental funding amounted to 25 
percent of the total budget of NGOs that registered with USAID (2006).”22 Therefore with a 
quarter of the budget dependent on the US government, it is hard to separate these organizations 
from government affairs. Whether it is an international or government donor, both have serious 
negative effects on the organization itself because the donor is given too much power.  
 Donor shifts in funding often leave NGOs with few choices in their following reactions. 
One of the main rationalities for their response is their dependency on a single donor for funding.  
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In the case study of four controlled environmental NGOs working in the same region of Lebanon 
(medium size organization, average $100,000 annual budget, and minimum of 12 year 
relationship with donors)
23
, the NGO with a more diverse financial portfolio was able to exit 
their contract and stay true to the origins of their missions, whereas the opposing NGOs adjusted 
to their donor’s demands in order to maintain steady funding flow.24 While dependency is not the 
only factor that is considered when an organization faces mission creep, as other indicators such 
as their brand strength, networking capabilities, and interdependent relationship with other 
organizations are also considered, it is still one of the more significant options weighed. 
25
 In 
order to make successful adjustments, the NGO must balance donor and organization demands.  
 Finally, resource dependence can be exacerbated by “the manner in which resources are 
provided.”26 Restrictions placed on funding by the donor actually influence the nature of the 
NGO and the activities it engages in. Rather than lose the money, an adjustment is often made to 
acquiesce to the donor’s demands in favor of receiving the funds. Additionally, “transnational 
NGOs adapt to their domestic environment by borrowing and drawing down endowments and 
operating cash to buffer volatile fundraising conditions, providing periods of at least temporary 
reprieve.”27 This creates the problem of accountability. On one hand a non-governmental 
organization is responsible to their beneficiaries, staff, and partners – this is considered a 
“downward” accountability.28 On the other hand, a non-governmental organization is responsible 
to their trustees, donors, and host governments, in what is called an “upward”29 accountability. 
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Overall, their ability to balance both downward and upward accountabilities determines how far 
they prioritize one over the other, and their ability to succeed in meeting their demands, rather 
than over accounting or under accounting to either pressure.  
 Fortunately there are proactive measures that organizations can take to ensure fewer 
vulnerabilities in their financial relationships with donors. This comes in the obvious form of 
having a “diverse funding base”30 so that the organization is not completely reliant on a single 
international or a government donor for the majority of their funds. Ideally, in terms of financial 
portfolios, a strong non-governmental organization will have the following characteristics: a 
wide variety of donors (both small and large), mostly unrestricted funds, an endowment for self-
sustainability, and finally a mixture of both national and international donors.
31
 Neither 
international nor government donors automatically cause a NGO to be vulnerable; however an 
over-reliance on either source for funds does create weaker organizations.  
Much of the research recommends revenue diversification to avoid the issues that arise 
with donors who have too much power. However, the caveat to diverse revenue sourcing is 
focusing on the type of funds that these organizations receive, as “An organization with 
unrestricted income from private individuals and restricted funding from a foundation could 
actually become more autonomous by reducing foundation support even though doing so would 
reduce diversification.”32 With unrestricted funding, a NGO has the opportunity to focus on what 
they feel would be the best programs and events that would have the most positive impact on a 
community. Without conditions, these organizations are free from the possibility of being 
controlled by their large donor. Obviously they are still held accountable, especially with large 
unrestricted donations, and need to ensure that the money is being utilized efficiently, but 
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unrestricted funding removes the pressure and power that most donors have over the 
organization itself. NGOs are better able to balance both upward and downward accountabilities, 
and working under the assumption that the organization itself does not squander the funds and 
finds the most marginal utility in each dollar (since unrestricted funding is rather uncommon in 
the NGO sector), the organization as a whole becomes stronger. Therefore, revenue 
diversification is about both finding difference sources for donations and finding the right type of 
funds with minimal or no restrictions.  
It is important for non-governmental organizations to maintain their legitimacy and 
autonomy when it comes to their finances because they act as integral parts of developing 
communities. They are able to act as both an effective check on the government with human 
rights or advocacy problems and provide services to the community that the current government 
is failing to fulfill, almost as an “alternative to the state.”33  “NGOs’ values make them suitable 
agents of inspired change. These organizations are perceived to be the “good guys,” with whom 
donors can partner to reinstate the legitimacy of assistance in developing countries.”34 However, 
in order to “reinstate the legitimacy” of developing countries, one must first ensure that these 
organizations are autonomous and legitimate themselves, which is where their financial portfolio 
plays a strong role in characterizing the organization, along with other measures such as the type 
of contracts initiated between NGOs and other parties.  
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SUPPLY-LED CONTRACTS 
The contracts that a non-governmental organization participates in can be correlated to 
creating a weaker institution because these play such a large part in influencing its reactions to 
shifts in both donor power and desire. As evidenced by the previous chapter, an organization’s 
autonomy is critical to its success, as a lack of independence is associated with hesitation 
regarding its ability to resist foreign influence in a host government’s affairs. This often causes 
state regulations to be detrimental to the non-governmental organization’s effectiveness in 
providing the goods and services that the citizens need. Conversely, “This is not to say that self-
regulations is always a good thing, nor that it is sufficient to ensure accountability, but the 
informal consultative processes and codes of ethics that characterize the voluntary sector in 
many countries…have preserved a balance between flexibility, innovation, and regulation.”1 To 
be a strong institution, the NGO needs to have the ability to self-regulate effectively.  This 
balance is not easy to maintain, as evidenced by the three main variables of organization size, 
market competition, and targeted finances that can all work against the organization itself by 
making it more vulnerable to donor manipulation. What is important to note is that the overall 
vulnerability of an organization can be enhanced or negated by the type of contracts that the 
NGO organization binds itself to: demand-led or supply-led. 
Demand-led contracts are the ideal situation for non-governmental organizations, as they 
maintain the most control and power over the situation. Much like an equal negotiation process 
between corporations, “NGOs would assume responsibility and take the initiative in designing 
                                                 
1
 Michael Edwards and David Hulme, “Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on Nongovernmental 
Organizations,” World Development 24 (1996):  969. 
43 
 
and presenting priorities and preferences.”2 Since there is a surplus of funding for the sector, the 
NGO has the power to wait for the right donor and make fewer concessions in negotiations 
because of the availability of alternative funding sources. This is not too far from Easterly’s 
model of good financing of nonprofit organizations as he often refers to the system’s 
effectiveness and success to asking “The Backward Question”: what can foreign aid do for poor 
people?
3
 While the NGO system differs slightly from that of direct foreign aid, the same 
methodology can be applied in demand-led contracts.  In this situation, the “donors would then 
place ‘consolidated resources at the disposal of local institutions who decide on and own the uses 
to which they are put’.”4 This is significant because it encourages communication between the 
donor and the NGO, as the donor is not going to allow the NGO to be wasteful with their 
resources, even if they are not designated towards a specific program.  Therefore, the NGO is 
able to fulfill its upward accountability while still balancing its social mission and desire to 
enable or enhance the lives of its beneficiaries. This responsibility to beneficiaries or towards the 
internal organizational mission and values can also be referred to a NGO fulfilling its downward 
accountabilities.
5
 In a demand-led contract agreement, the non-government organization has the 
flexibility and power to be an equal with the donor in their negotiations, making it the desired 
contractual model. 
The ability to balance both responsibilities is made possible with demand-led contracts 
because “these imperatives [of development] align with the demand-led approach to empower 
marginalized groups, encourage voice, focus on stakeholders, highlight flexibility and risk 
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taking, and invest in impact-oriented programs toward long-term goals and sustainable results.”6 
In an ideal world, perfect execution of this contract would lead to a more efficient and impactful 
non-governmental organization sector on a global scale. The organization has more lasting 
impact as it tends to influence organizations to focus on long-term, sustainable goals, in addition 
to empowering the local people. It is significant to recognize that the demand-led approach has 
positive lasting consequences beyond the donor-NGO partnership. Unfortunately, this type of 
contractual agreement does not happen as often as the “negotiation is heavily influenced by the 
relative power of the two actors.”7 Unless the NGO has a bigger reputation and minimal 
organization market competition in the country or sector, donors often have the greater leverage 
at the negotiations table.
8
 When donors have greater power than the NGOs, which can be caused 
by vulnerabilities distinctly dependent on the organization size, market competition, and targeted 
financial portfolio, NGOs often end up in toxic contracts otherwise known as supply-led 
contracts.   
The most dominant donor-NGO relationship is the supply-led contract, which is defined 
by funding that is directed at a specific goal or program by the donor.
9
 “The relationship here is 
principally one-way, where donors set program objectives and NGOs implement programs and 
are expected to send back information in the form of reports and evaluations.”10  Since there are 
enough alternative non-governmental organization options, the NGO has no leverage to prevent 
the donor from walking away, hence the supply-led nature of the contract. In the basic overview 
of a supply-led contract, it is clear that the donor is running the entire program and has the most 
power within the relationship. The vulnerabilities of an NGO allow it to be at the mercy and will 
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of a donor, especially in regards to objectives and core mission statements. Unfortunately, the 
most vulnerable characteristics of NGOs are three-fold (organization size, market competition, 
and targeted finances), which only reinforce the power that donors have in a supply-led contract. 
Donor programs and priorities are unstable and often are influenced by the latest trends in NGO 
sectors, which means that funding for advocacy NGOs and other “unpopular” services will be 
cut or severely lessened, which increases the competition for a smaller funding pool, and the 
smaller organizations often struggle to survive. Donors then take advantages of the increased 
competition for their money and the decreased amount of organizations available to receive their 
funds by increasing their demands and specifications for programs (supply-led contracts). 
11
 This 
negative feedback loop is toxic and often escalates to such a degree that it affects the entire 
regional NGO sector from a few donor actions, regardless if the donor is governmental or 
international. In the end, “the usual result is that many NGOs will lose, and those that remain 
will be much more closely aligned with donor priorities and interests.”12 NGO autonomy is lost, 
and through this unnatural market selection of surviving organizations, the remaining NGOs that 
are closely aligned with donor priorities and interests often lose their effectiveness and fall into 
co-optation by donor-prioritizing of financial needs. Much like other negative feedback loops 
seen in the NGO sector, this supply-led approach starts with donors in power and only enhances 
their leverage in the situation as funds become more exclusive and NGO competition increases 
dramatically.  
 There are serious negative consequences for non-governmental organizations which 
allow themselves to be a part of supply-led contracts. Most importantly, these consequential 
changes “lead to bureaucratization, lack of cooperation, duplication of initiatives, falloff in 
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flexibility and innovation, and conflicting accountability mechanisms.”13 One of the most 
frequent complaints regarding non-governmental organizations is that there are too many trying 
to do the same thing, in other words, “duplication of initiatives.” Supply-led contracts only add 
to this existing problem by forcing NGOs to cater to their donors, rather than follow a natural 
supply and demand market system for their beneficiaries.  Donors tell the citizens what they need 
rather than letting the citizens tell them what they actually need, much like Sachs rather than 
Easterly and his “Backwards Question.” This is reflected in NGO research analysis of the 
supply-led approach, which claims that “the resulting problem is that NGOs capture the voice of 
the people and decide on their behalf instead of channeling their voice into decisions.”14 
Suddenly the organizations which should be fighting on the people’s behalf, whether it be a 
human rights, public advocacy, or environmental mission, are no longer a viable outlet for their 
complaints to be heard because of the NGO’s vulnerability and dependency on the donor. 
Organizations lose their downward accountability to their beneficiaries, mission statements, and 
business values, in favor of the upward accountability to donors who have power over their 
finances and priorities.
15
 More often than not, “NGOs have to dramatically transform their 
organizational interests and cultures to align with those of other members in the circle. In doing 
so, they lose much of their identity and interaction with constituents.”16 The blame for NGO co-
optation and mission creep cannot be solely held by the donor’s manipulation, as external factors 
regarding the nature of NGO-donor contracts in general do change the overall scenario in which 
both parties must navigate and negotiate the various terms.  
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 NGO-donor contracts are often shaky contracts to begin with because they are a donor 
alternative to direct agreements with host governments themselves. Rather than deal with the 
host government and try and negotiate with them, international donors, and even national ones, 
will use NGOs as a middle-man to influence local governments in their favor. For example, 
foreign donors can easily push agendas that would be contradictory to an authoritarian 
government and since the NGOs are heavily reliant on their funds, they would implement 
programs that included activities such as “‘the advancement of human and democratic rights,’ 
‘the promotion of equality of nations, nationalities and peoples and that of gender and religion,’ 
[and] ‘the promotion of conflict resolution or reconciliation.’”17  Non-governmental 
organizations that might have originally been reluctant to engage in such controversial issues 
would now have strong incentives to do so, per donor requests, which would inevitably effect the 
host government. This explains why countries such as Russia and Egypt would prohibit foreign 
donors.  This is significant especially when it comes to how binding a contract is because 
“should a donor decide to alter its obligations, it is easier to dissolve funding agreements with 
NGOs than with the governments where donors have complicated and binding bilateral 
agreements.”18 The foundation for this relationship is already fragile as the contracts themselves 
are easier to dissolve, and therefore this affects the competition and the reactions of the non-
governmental organizations, as they know that their program and organization financing is 
vulnerable to donor satisfaction and desires. Therefore it comes to no surprise that in these 
contracting situations NGOs “align their missions with donor preferences, emulate for-profit 
contractors, and ultimately abandon their missions in pursuit of financial security.”19 
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Organizations like nonprofits were not created to emulate the for-profit sector and therefore 
automatically have a disadvantage when they come to the negotiating table. Additionally, the 
donors themselves are often vulnerable to other external influences, which passes on the second-
hand pressure to the non-governmental organizations they are financing. 
 It is important to recognize that donors also have other accountabilities and 
responsibilities, and do not intentionally mean to create the serious negative consequences for 
NGOs in supply-led contracts. “For bilateral donors, the political, strategic, personnel, and 
economic factors that influence funding decisions are always changing, bringing inevitable shifts 
in funding levels among countries, program areas, and recipient organizations.”20 It is important 
to recognize that both donors and NGOs themselves face similar pressures, especially with 
regards to money, and can succumb to the same coping mechanisms of co-optation in response. 
The donors have upward accountabilities that they have to take into consideration and balance. It 
is also significant to recognize that not all NGOs are equally susceptible to conforming to the 
donor’s will, but it does not imply that they will be completely immune either.  “While private 
foundations are more insulated from these external factors, their funding also fluctuates in 
response to changing approaches, personnel, and financial realities.”21 These larger trends of “in” 
social projects and missions have a greater influence on the NGO sector as a whole than what 
would be initially perceived from the name “non-governmental” organizations. These external 
pressures also do not remove the accountability of both donors and NGOs for their reactions to 
the fluctuations in personal, financial, and political pressures. However, with non-governmental 
organizations, the three main factors of organization size, market competition, and targeted 
finances, all lead them to be more vulnerable to accepting supply-led contracts. These three 
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characteristics only enhance their weakness once in the supply-led contract, as it influences what 
the organization itself is capable of doing when donor pressures begin to change its mission in 
three of the four main categories of EVLA: exiting the relationship, voicing concerns, loyalty to 
the donor, or adjustment to the donor’s interests.  
 When an NGO faces donors with the greater leverage and power to manipulate the 
organization’s programs and missions to their own personal desires, the NGO is often left with 
few options with regards to its reactions. This categorization of reactions is an adjusted typology 
from the original Hirschman’s (1970) model of EVLA. The first is to exit the relationship, in 
which situation they would lose contact with the donor, and also terminate all funds or funding 
requests.
22
 The second option is to voice their concerns with the donor in hopes of reaching a 
middle ground between the two parties.
23
 The third is loyalty, which suggests that the NGO will 
automatically comply with the donor’s demands unconsciously.24 The final option which was 
later added to Hirschman’s model, is adjustment, which implies that they will accommodate the 
donor’s interests and make the necessary changes to maintain the relationship but only after a 
conscious deliberation regarding their actions.
25
 The reaction they choose is dependent on their 
accountability dynamic. “In brief, the stronger the downward or internal accountability, the more 
likely an NGO is to exit or exercise voice. Conversely, upward accountability is associated more 
with reactions of adjustment.”26 This is when the other three main vulnerabilities of the NGO 
matters because it determines how much leverages the organization has to respond with. This 
quote also emphasizes the importance of the donors in both the policy process and government 
                                                 
22
 AbouAssi, “Hands in the Pockets of Mercurial Donors,” 597. 
23
 Ibid 
24
 Khaldoun AbouAssi, “Get Money Get Involved? NGO’s Reactions to Donor Funding and Their Potential 
Involvement in the Public Policy Processes,” International Society for Third-Sector Research 25 (2014): 972. 
25
 Ibid 
26
 AbouAssi, “Hands in the Pockets of Mercurial Donors,” 596. 
50 
 
interactions. “Donors are key players in aid recipient countries. Donors shape national policies 
by negotiation priorities with governments and channeling, conditioning, and controlling aid.”27 
Therefore it is important to recognize how this would affect non-governmental organizations in 
the EVLA process. In order to gain a better understanding, a micro-study of this process was 
done by AbouAssi in the Middle East.  
 In this study, three NGOs with the same donor were analyzed in their reactions to the 
shifts in donor funding due to shifting priorities.  The case focused on Lebanon NGOs because 
the “country’s struggling economy increases reliance on external sources of revenues (including 
foreign assistance, loans, and treasury bonds).”28  Additionally, Lebanon was chosen because it 
is a Middle Eastern country in which international donors face no interference from the 
government with regards to their funding NGO organizations, which implies a high degree of 
donor dependence.
29
  After careful analysis, interview, and selection process three similar NGOs 
with environmental missions were selected, all medium sized organizations, in the same 
geographic area. The homogeneity between the organizations was an attempt to minimize the 
effect of external conditions beyond donor pressure. 
30
 The three NGOS will be referred to as 
NGO1, NGO2, and NGO3, because the researcher chose to preserve their anonymity in the 
study.   
  The first NGO practiced their right to exit their donor relationship as a response to their 
dissatisfaction with the changes in donor funding.  In order to compensate for the loss of funds, 
NGO1 relied more heavily on volunteers and limited their operations to one to two projects.  
Since there was an increase in volunteer time expended on the NGO, “the reliance on volunteers 
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requires the organization to design project activities to keep these volunteers mobilized.”31 
Therefore, while the non-governmental organization whose mission was focused on the 
environment managed to avoid mission creep by leaving their donor, they were not unsusceptible 
to change, as they became more activist-oriented as a coping mechanism with fewer funds. The 
result was that “the preference to focus less on low-key operational-level activities drives NGO1 
to work more on mobilizing the public to exert pressure towards broader non-specific change.”32 
Releasing their donor also resulted in further government confrontation and tension as their 
activism increased. While it is important to note that NGO1’s choice to exit was an exhibition of 
power over donor demands, they were less likely to work with the government (or in lieu of 
government failures). Their adjustment to less funding was to increase the amount of people 
from the area for their mission and exercise their power of voice. 
 NGO2 uses its legitimacy in name and leverages its local networks to maintain an equal 
partnership between both the donor and the government. Therefore, when the donor shifted its 
funding priorities, NGO2 exercised its voice.  This was possible because “there is a degree of 
mutual interdependence in an arrangement that respects and maximizes organizational identity. 
The organization has developed strong relationship with the donor and floats inside the donor 
network of local partners”33  This is significant in recognizing the degree of autonomy NGO2 
has within the relationship that mirrors a demand-led contract, more than a supply-led one. By 
expressing its opinion and concerns with the new donor funding agenda, NGO2 uses its 
credibility and local network adjust the new funding criteria, while still maintaining a positive 
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donor relationship. 
34
 The benefits of this demand-led approach also extend to NGO2’s 
relationship with the government. It engages with the government in formulating public policies 
and engaging public agencies, which lessens its reliance on pure donor funds and allows for 
more leeway to exercise its voice without fear of losing critical donor funds. NGO2 is not 
vulnerable to the government, nor is it manipulated by it, but rather “NGO2 is a supplementary 
actor, providing technical and financial resources when the government fails to do the job or 
lacks resources or flexibility to act.”35 This is a model of a mutually beneficial relationship 
between donor-NGO-government, in which there is an open dialogue free to express dissent, and 
the actors work to support one another. Unfortunately NGO2 is considered a “pioneer” for their 
cooperation and collaboration, rather the norm of the environment NGO sector in Lebanon. 
However, it is a good example for the future of NGO-donor relationships and the effectiveness of 
good contractual agreements along with diverse financial portfolios.  
 NGO2’s relationship with the government is unique in that it avoided co-optation, which 
often occurs when the “boundaries between the two are not clear since each side tries to 
manipulate or convince the other its own goals are better in order to fully benefit from available 
means they agree on.”36 The more dominant organization in this relationship tends to lead the 
direction of the following programs and policies. Since NGO2 is seen as an equal entity, it is 
better able to collaborate and participate with the government, rather than succumb to its 
demands or convictions that its methods are more correct. Maintaining this critical boundary 
between working together and supplementing one another is crucial to the strength and 
independence of an NGO organization. As evidenced by NGO research in Lebanon, Egypt, and 
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Turkey, “indeterminate boundaries between states and civil society organizations in these 
countries are problematic since these organizations are interested in social transformation but 
they use the same methods and cannot function away from the state.”37 This problem of co-
optation is also not limited to NGO-government relationships, but can also be seen in NGO-
donor relationships as well.  
 Finally, NGO3 reacts differently by adjusting to donor demands. The donor “manipulates 
the NGO3 through funding and benefits from NGO3’s local infrastructure to implement its 
policies.”38 Funding was prioritized above the organization’s core environmental mission and 
therefore there were a few negative effects as a consequence. The organization underwent co-
optation which was then justified by its argument that the donor’s changes were actually aligned 
with its core missions, when they clearly did not. The activities the NGO participated in became 
more “scattered” as they were unlinked to the core values of the organization and with that came 
the loss of organization identity. This then affected the public credibility of NGO3 as a 
trustworthy environmental organization, an effect that NGO3 struggled to recover from as the 
locals perceived the organization to no longer be representative of their demands and desires.
39
 
Finally, NGO3 had a changed relationship with the government as it no longer cooperated with 
them, but still appeared to have a similar mission. Rather than being actively involved with 
public policy formation, they are complementary to the government without an active 
“cooperative relationship.”40 By adjusting to donor demands in a supply-led approach, NGO3 
lost its relationship with both its beneficiaries and its government, in favor of secure finances. Its 
effectiveness was decreased to the dissemination of environmental information, as its 
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organizational identity was redirected towards the donor’s priorities. Adjustment meant that 
NGO3 made a conscious decision to accept donor demands rather than attempt to adjust to less 
funding as NGO1 did, and therefore took a calculated gamble that negatively affected their 
organization.  
 These three non-governmental organizations are examples of the reactions that NGOs can 
utilize in response to shifts in donor funding. As evidenced by the micro-experimentation and 
analysis above, the contractual relationship that the donor has with the NGO makes a difference 
in its responses. The supply-led approach tends to have greater consequences for the NGO, 
regardless of their continuation of the relationship, as it is either a victim of co-optation or 
struggles to compensate for the lack of previously donated funds. The demand-led approach is 
ideal in that the NGO has the most power to leverage its resources, remain effective, and use its 
voice in the partnership, rather than being the subject of ownership by donor parties.  The ability 
for the NGO to engage in different contracts depends on the strength it has before working with 
other organizations, which is dependent on its organization size, the market competition, and its 
financial portfolio. If it does not maintain a healthy balance of these three characteristics, such 
that they work in the organization’s favor, rather than functioning as vulnerabilities, then the 
NGO has more power when entering donor and government relationships. However, should they 
maintain vulnerabilities in any of the three areas mentioned above, they increase the likelihood 
that they will enter a supply-led contract, which would only increase the chances of co-optation 
and mission creep as they struggle to maintain autonomy and fulfill shifting donor demands. 
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SOLUTIONS AND PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 
 Non-governmental organizations have three main vulnerabilities: organization size, 
market competition (both within the NGO and donor pool), and targeted finances. These 
characteristics weaken the power of an NGO and often force them to enter into less than ideal 
supply-led contract situations. In these situations, donors have greater power and leverage when 
negotiating, which further weakens the autonomy of the NGO and makes them susceptible to co-
optation. Thankfully, these problems, while seemingly inherent to the business on a global scale, 
are avoidable with the right preventative measures that look into donor relationships, finance 
revisions, internal NGO affairs, donor expectation and demand adjustments, citizen input, and 
global strategy for transnational organizations.  
 One way to increase nonprofit effectiveness is by changing their relationship with both 
the government and donors through their reputation. By working towards the ideal of a high 
performing, goal-oriented non-governmental organization, they can strengthen their reputation as 
a reliable entity and make themselves more desirable in the eyes of public agencies. “NGOs 
favored by public agencies they are working with secure additional access to funding 
opportunities and, more important, become visible; they are invited to attend public events, 
participate in policy forums, or provide feedback.”1 Being a favored NGO is one of the best case 
scenarios for an organization, because it allows them to be more successful. Organizations that 
have access to politics and policy makers have greater ability to effect more change in their 
favor. This can be seen by the fact that a strong reputation grants access to political and public 
participation, resulting in essentially a free marketing platform for the cause. These benefits then 
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lead to more positive feedback as “other public agencies start to notice these organizations and 
become interested to work with them…therefore, it is possible for the same type of relationship 
to be replicated or shared across agencies.”2 Maintaining good relations with other agencies 
reinforces and enhances the reputation of an organization.  
However, there should be caution when looking at non-governmental organizations 
which are heavily into politics and lobbying as they are more susceptible to having a conflict of 
interest between donors and their missions. Yet it would be difficult to find an NGO that does 
not engage in some form of political activity, whether it is on the local or national level. Politics 
is increasingly becoming a larger part of the NGO sector because organizations which remain 
true to their cause can effect serious change. “NGOs should be strategic in navigating their 
reactions to shifting donor tides while they steer their relations with government to induce 
change and make a difference.”3 It should also be noted that those organizations most in the 
public eye are correspondingly under the scrutiny of the public and the agencies that they work 
for, so there could potentially be a greater accountability mechanism for them. For example, the 
Tobacco Free Kids campaign is a grassroots effort to promote regulation of tobacco. Their 
mobilization efforts to raise awareness and successful lobbying efforts actually resulted in “37 
percent drop in youth smoking and a nearly 16 percent decline in adults.”4   As evidenced by the 
tobacco case, “constructing strong ties with the donor might generate positive effects at the 
policy level and on the relationship with government, as long as the NGO does not chase the 
funding and become concerned with operational success."
5
 This can also be seen in the case of 
Bangladeshi NGOs working in education, as “strategic alliance and strategic funding” increased 
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their impact by “a process of influence, networking, training and legal or policy reform” which 
ultimately changed the government education policies to mimic the support of local NGOs.
6
 This 
example contradicts the trend where it was shown that governments were expecting non-
governmental organizations to function in lieu of their efforts. Interestingly, Bangladesh has 
made some motion towards the two sectors working in tandem with one another as the 
government improved their social provisions for education to better match the NGOs. The main 
hurdle for non-governmental organizations is the initial construction of this reputation and good-
standing relationship with governments.  
One of the biggest ways NGOs can make themselves less vulnerable to donors is by 
working on their financial portfolio and strategies. Having targeted finances is one of the easiest 
ways for donors to manipulate organizations because they maintain greater leverage when the 
organization does not have a diversified funds and it makes resource dependence common. 
“Organizations are vulnerable to mission creep when resources are especially scarce, as 
experienced by many human rights and conflict resolution organization.”7 Some dramatic efforts 
which are proposed solutions to reverse the tendency of mission creep is “specialization” and 
“commercialization.” Specialized NGOs are very uncommon because of the tendency for donors 
to shift and broaden an organization’s mission over time through the market pressures of low 
competition among funds and high competition among NGOs.
8
 Specialization in an NGO can 
not only help the organization stay true to its mission, but it can also help attract the right kinds 
of donors which are less likely to shift to current funding trends over time. However, this option 
is rather difficult for an organization to implement, as it would be risky financially as a solution. 
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The opposite solution of commercialization has been proposed before, as it would improve 
“organizational self-sufficiency” which would allow for less resource dependence.9 For example, 
a commercialized NGO would be Grameen Bank which is a micro-finance institution that gives 
loans to the poor (its beneficiaries) which then generates income for their programs and 
operations.
10
 However, adopting such for-profit strategies through the process of 
commercialization is an equally risky solution proposal because it could prioritize financial 
security over programs and services provided. This is already an issue within the nonprofit 
sector, and therefore a solution which has a significant chance of inducing this same problem is 
counter-productive. While the ideas of “commercialization” and “specialization” are two of the 
less popular theories for dealing with resource dependence, there are more tangible solutions to 
mitigate negative effects.  
The first and most obvious change for NGOs to make to strengthen their organization is 
to diversify the funding base. If resource dependence is caused by over-reliance on a few donors, 
then ensuring that there is a wide number of donors, or more specifically, unrestricted funds, and 
a wide range of public and private sources would encourage less dependence on a single donor 
and therefore disperse donor power among many agencies rather than a few. There is also less of 
a chance that non-governmental organizations would be too close to foreign or host government 
motives if they are not fully dependent on them for their resources, increasing their autonomy 
and room for advocacy. Another preventative measure is creating “mission-core programs that 
are revenue financed.”11 This would also help mitigate the negative effects of resource 
dependence, because organizations would be generating their own revenue to fund their 
                                                 
9
 Mitchell, “Strategic Responses to Resource Dependence,” 88. 
10
 “Bank for the Poor – Review,” accessed April 19, 2016. 
http://www.grameen.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=215&Itemid=541&limit=1&limitstart=1
1. 
11
 Ibid. 
59 
 
programs and operations, making them less reliant on only outside funds. Some of these methods 
would include “ethical investments, cooperative enterprises, memberships, etc.”12 For example, 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) is a large NGO that created a market called 
Aarong. Aarong employs villagers, mostly women, to create different crafts and products which 
they sell at fair trade prices. The profit from these goods then goes directly to funding different 
programs within BRAC. Under this model with multiple social enterprises and microfinance, 
BRAC is able to finance 73% of their own development programs.
13
 An ideal ratio has been 
calculated out as the total amount of external assistance should be no more than 30% of total 
funding and the remainder should be internal financing.
14
 However, having a diverse financial 
portfolio and a good ratio of internal to external finances can only take an organization so far in 
regards to reducing resource dependence. The other major avenue for reducing the vulnerability 
of target finances is to look at the organizational development. 
An organization should have a strong reflective development structure in order to 
maintain the current situation and troubleshoot problems. NGOs “need to invest more in their 
own organizational development so that they are better able to identify the negative impact of 
changes in their funding sources or role, and act accordingly.”15 If an organization has greater 
awareness of how their funding sources are changing and impacting them, then they can make an 
informed decision on whether or not they should adjust their mission statements or programs to 
accommodate new donor demands and if these demands are still in alignment with their ultimate 
goals. Methods for achieving this would include “more attention to research, learning, 
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monitoring and evaluation, so that the all-important link between measurement and 
accountability can be strengthened. Above all, it means being clear about the overall direction of 
the organization and its function in society.”16 This is significant because greater organizational 
consciousness can prevent drastic consequences to organizations such as mission creep. If 
organizations maintain a certain “economy of self-sufficiency”17 then they function more 
autonomously from their funding sources. This again goes back to the reflective and conscious 
nature of successful organizations as they search for “ethical investments, cooperative 
enterprises, memberships, etc.”18 Resource dependence is avoided if non-governmental 
organizations are more aware of how their financial portfolio is looking and from whom they are 
getting their donations. In addition to this, ultimately the strength of an NGO is “the deep 
philosophical commitment of many NGO leaders to remain genuinely need-driven,” in other 
words “turning down money as a matter of principle.”19 Non-governmental organizations have a 
choice when it comes to their donors, and while market pressures and their organization size may 
work against them and put them in a weaker position, there is always the option of losing the 
funds or negotiating in order to stay true to the cause. This is not a novel idea, as some large 
transnational NGOs do engage in this practice and more organizations within the sector really 
should adopt this trait as well. By staying committed to their cause, these NGOs are strategically 
reinforcing their purpose and the power that they have, despite the greater leverage that donors 
hold, as the ultimate decision of whether or not they submit to co-optation or mission creep lies 
in their hands. While NGOs need to take responsibility for their actions, it is also fair to say that 
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donors can take proactive measures to ensure that NGOs are also staying true to their core 
missions.  
Donors do not hold sole responsibility for the vulnerabilities of NGOs and institutional 
isomorphism because “while NGOs rely on donors for financial support, so do donors rely on 
NGOs for other forms of resources.”20 Donors are funding these non-governmental organizations 
to support a cause and help create positive changes for sectors that they want to help improve. 
Even if donors most often have the leverage and the “reciprocity is not necessarily 
symmetrical”21 there is some form of mutual dependence between NGOs and their donors. 
Therefore donors can take proactive measures to help ensure the longevity and strength of the 
organizations they support. One of the simplest ways a donor can contribute to less finance 
vulnerabilities that lead to mission creep is by funding “longer term grants or managed capital 
endowments.”22 In doing so, these organizations can feel more secure in the sustainability of 
their funds and there would be less chance of the NGO becoming trapped in over-fundraising. 
Additionally, by reducing short-term threats of falling funds, NGOs can maintain their autonomy 
from donors and have enough time to find alternatives in the event of donor changes in 
prioritization of funds.
23
 The Ford Foundation is a good example of this positive behavior as they 
created small capital endowments for the NGOs who were awarded their grants in the 
Philippines.
24
 Small capital endowments were beneficial to the grantees because it created an 
“ongoing source of income,” gave greater stability and reputation as a long-term responsible 
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organization, and most importantly removed some pressure to meet annual funding goals.
25
  
More donors and large foundations should emulate this practice to create more stability for NGO 
finances and relieve market pressures with high demands for funds. 
Another tactic that donors can employ is working with and supporting local donors. In 
doing so they can accelerate the development of domestic funding by preventing problems with 
credibility and allegations of foreign manipulation that severely affect a NGO’s reputation, 
especially those in the advocacy sector.
26
  A good reputation, as asserted above, can lead the way 
towards the organization working effectively with the host government and collaborating more, 
as they are given larger platforms to the public and a spot at relevant policy negotiations tables. 
Having a strong foreign donor who collaborates with the NGO rather than dictating what it 
would like to be done can seriously boost its performance and outreach capabilities. “As donor 
priorities expand into new program areas, NGOs may feel compelled to pursue funding even in 
areas where they have no experience... As the scope of NGO activities broadens in response to 
shifting donor priorities, the autonomy and independence of the NGO will suffer.” 27 By 
removing that pressure or incentive to broaden a mission and by encouraging loyalty to their 
founding purposes, NGOs can continue to become experts in their field and really understand the 
root cause of the problem when creating solutions. It is in the donor, host government, 
beneficiary, and NGO’s interest if the donors allow for greater autonomy though collaboration, 
as this allows the non-governmental organizations to become more innovative, less vulnerable, 
and effective in their mission.  
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Additionally, the benefits of an autonomous NGO-donor relationship can actually change 
the nature of the host government beyond assisting their government-NGO relationship. “When 
donors allow the NGO to maintain its autonomy the grantee is likely to improve its influence in 
the domestic political environment, and eventually be more effective at fostering reforms and 
improving government accountability.”28 This cooperative relationship between a donor and 
NGO can have major benefits that go beyond improving the organization to improving the region 
itself. Encouraging better “domestic political environments” allows for lasting positive changes 
to a nation, where the donors have to put in very little input to possibly initiate such a grand 
outcome. With government reforms and accountability, donors have the ability to actually 
change the environment within the NGO sector of a region through their collaborative support. 
This is why it is so important to allow NGOs to remain autonomous and keep their unique 
characteristics rather than encouraging practices or changes that would drive the organization 
further away, because an organization that is supported has more ability to create greater and 
even more effective change within a region. 
Should the donor be working with an advocacy NGO, there are certain actions that can be 
taken to enhance their organization’s strength and prevent common vulnerabilities. The first of 
these is an increased caution and awareness that credit is not taken from the organizations 
themselves when they successfully fund institutions that create positive reform or political 
alterations.  Most donors initially revert to taking the credit because there is an increasing 
pressure for them to justify their funding and show tangible evidence of its success.
29
 However, 
the negative consequences of doing so can reverse any positive changes that were initially 
present. When donors “claim publically that their interventions were instrumental in the adoption 
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of a new law, or a successful reform movement” it “can lead to a political backlash against 
advocacy-NGO grantees.”30 This is evidenced by countries such as Egypt and Russia which 
steadfastly refuse to let in foreign funds for fear that it would allow foreign influence into 
domestic affairs.  This fear causes a great loss in available funds to existing NGOs and then a 
greater reliance on the host government for resources. Host governments then have greater 
access and input in the affairs of an organization that supposedly is “non-governmental,” and so 
the negative cycle of lost autonomy and effectiveness continues. However, if donors were more 
cautious in justifying their funding decisions without taking credit for the local organization’s 
successes, they could decrease the chance of such a “political backlash” and allow the advocacy 
NGOs to continue successfully working for their beneficiaries and slowly reforming the 
government. 
Finally, donors can promote stronger NGOs by “de-emphasiz[ing] the control and 
verification function of evaluation” and “put[ting] learning back on the agenda.”31 In other 
words, NGOs need to have room to experiment and try radical solutions rather than being 
punished for failed programs. If the NGO is encouraged to learn from its mistakes and from 
other organizations, then there is more incentive to be innovative with solutions. In order for this 
to happen, “funding decisions must be distanced from evaluation.”32  
Donors are not the only actors who can make changes to ensure that there is greater 
strength and stability among NGOs, as there is a proposed solution for citizens to help as well. 
This is proposed through the idea of a “citizen’s fund” which is “a public financial contribution 
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based on the allocation of one’s day’s wage.33” While this theory has yet to be actualized, and 
still has many flaws with regards to the “redistribution of existing resources between individuals 
and social groups,” 34  there is something to be said for the idea of the local community 
financially supporting an organization that directly supports it. For example, in some South-East 
Asian countries, domestic companies and institutions were their main alternative for resources 
after there was a large drop in external support.
35
 For example, BRAC is a large NGO in 
Bangladesh that works across many different development divisions, such as health, education, 
and agriculture. One of its key principles is the idea that it is an organization founded in 
Bangladesh, by Bangladeshis, and continues to have the majority of its workforce be 
Bangladeshi as well. As a result, the NGO is filled with workers who understand the local 
problems and want to further develop their own home country. This sense of national pride 
allows the organization to have an internal accountability to not only their donors and 
beneficiaries, but also to those who run their programs, which creates a large incentive for the 
NGO to stay true to its mission and have greater support and incentives against co-optation.  
 There are a wide range of preventative measures and solutions that a non-governmental 
organization can employ in order to be less vulnerable to mission creep and institutional 
isomorphism. Some of these mechanisms include working on the organization’s reputation in 
order to positively affect their relationships with donors and government officials. Other 
strategies are focused more specifically on the NGO’s finances such as diversifying funding 
bases and generating more internal revenue. Donors are also included as solutions to a NGO’s 
vulnerabilities, as they can relieve pressures and support the founding principles of an institution 
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by investing in long term grants and working collaboratively with locals. Through these solutions 
and preventative measures, non-governmental organizations can generate positive relationships 
in their local governments and improve the political environments to create lasting change in 
their region. 
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CONCLUSION 
 This thesis explored the characteristics which make non-governmental organizations 
susceptible to funding manipulation. These three main vulnerabilities are organization size, 
market competition, and targeted finances which all lead to increasing the chances that the NGO 
would enter a supply-led contract. These supply-led contracts then further weaken the 
organization to funding manipulation by enhancing the already existing vulnerabilities which 
increase donor power and control to ultimately result in institutional isomorphism.  
 Smaller organizations are not explicitly more vulnerable than larger ones, however larger 
NGOs have much greater advantages which allow them to be stronger institutions in the face of 
external factors, such as donor shifts in funds. The number of positive characteristics of large 
organizations with regards to their innovation is significantly more than that of smaller NGOs. 
Interestingly, these characteristics mirror those associated with a large and highly effective board 
of directors, both attributes which are often linked to large organizations. Smaller NGOs are not 
inherently vulnerable because of their size, but rather they are vulnerable because they are 
disadvantaged by not having the access to resources and key networks that has been paired with 
large organizations. Therefore, smaller non-governmental organizations often have fewer 
resources and are more dependent on fewer donors, leading to supply-led contracts.  
 Market competition is another vulnerability for NGOs because there is high market 
competition within the NGO sector and low market competition between donors.  This means 
there is high demand for a limited supply of funds. Market competition and its resulting behavior 
creates negative feedback loops that have grave, albeit unintended consequences for NGOs 
beyond the basic finance issues. Cooperation between organizations and individual innovation is 
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lost as organizations become more at risk to meeting donor demands in return for funds. Donors 
themselves maintain their powerful position with few competitors, and since NGOs become 
more competitive and less collaborative amongst themselves, donors have many alternative 
organizations in which to invest their funds should they become dissatisfied with their current 
organization. Greater donor power often implies that NGOs will be subjected to toxic supply led 
contracts in return for funding.  
 The third major vulnerability in non-governmental organizations is targeted finances. 
This reveals the organization’s overall financial fragility as it is dependent on a few sources, 
which makes it more susceptible to funding manipulation by governments. Funding dependency 
is categorized by both governmental and international donors who often look to control finances 
as a means of gaining greater control over the NGO, which often results in dramatic 
consequences such as changed mission statements or political manipulation. Without internal 
assessment protocols and the prioritization of financial stability and diversity, non-governmental 
organizations maintain this weakness and allow themselves to be vulnerable to the various 
consequential effects of donor power, including entering into a supply-led contract.  
 Supply-led contracts are extremely detrimental to a non-governmental organization 
because the organization’s contractual relationship creates a great effect on the response of a 
NGO when a donor shifts its priorities or demands. The supply-led contract places an NGO at a 
disadvantage with negative effects because they either fall into co-optation or struggle with the 
loss of donor funds. This type of contract does not allow the NGO to act as a partner in the 
relationship and leave room for dissent, as donors maintain strong financial leverage over the 
organization. A non-governmental organization’s initial strength before entering into a contract 
is critical in determining which type of contract they enter. In order to achieve an ideal demand-
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led contract where the NGO-donor relationship is more of a partnership, the NGO must mitigate 
their three main vulnerabilities, organization size, market competition, and targeted finances, in 
order to decrease the likelihood of being forced into a supply-led contract and ultimately 
succumbing to mission creep, co-optation, and loss of autonomy.  
 Non-governmental organizations can engage in a wide range of preventative measures 
and solutions which would help strengthen their institutions and decrease the likelihood of 
institutional isomorphism. These methods include enhancing an NGO’s reputation in order to 
foster greater positive relationships with both donors and governments. Other strategies suggest 
ways for a non-governmental organization to improve their financial portfolios through methods, 
such as funding diversification, that make them less resource dependent. Another type of 
solution addresses donors and how they can remove pressures on NGOs through simple tactic 
like increasing the timeframe of their grants or demanding less program change conditions with 
their funds. Ultimately these preventative measures and solutions work to strengthen a non-
governmental organization. This way, the vulnerabilities that lead them to resource dependence 
and supply-led contracts are less likely to be present. If these NGOs can stay true to their 
founding purpose and continue on as effective autonomous institutions, they can create positive 
relationships with both donors and governments which would result in lasting change for the 
beneficiaries they serve.
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